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There are both high resource and political costs in defining and enforcing property rights to 
water and in managing it with markets. In this paper, I examine these issues in the semi-arid U.S. 
West where many of the intensifying demand and supply problems regarding fresh water are 
playing out. I begin by illustrating the current state of water markets in 12 western U.S. states. 
There are major differences in water prices across uses (agriculture, urban, environmental) and 
these  differences  appear  to  persist,  suggesting  that  water  markets  have  not  developed  fully 
enough to narrow the gaps.  Moreover, there is considerable difference in the extent and nature 
of water trading across the western states, suggesting that water values and transaction costs of 
trade vary considerably across jurisdictions. I then turn to the resource and political costs of 
defining water rights and expanding the use of markets.  In this discussion, efficiency and equity 
objectives play important, often conflicting, roles.  This tension reflects the very social nature of 
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There is growing concern about the availability of fresh water worldwide, as demand 
grows and as supplies become more uncertain due to the potential effects of climate change.  
With rising per capita incomes and growing populations, human consumption of water is rising, 
just as demands for water for agriculture, recreation, and environmental habitats are increasing.
1  
At  the  same  time, climate change  is  predicted  to  make precipitation  more  variable  with  the 
possibility of longer drought periods (Barnett et al., 2008; World Water Assessment Program, 
2009).   As water values rise due to increased demand and limited supply, one might expect that 
formal  property  rights  to  water  would  be  made  more  precise  and  that  water  markets  would 
become active to more effectively address allocation, management, and conservation pressures.  
A process of property rights development and market activity as asset values exogenously 
rise  was  described  by  Harold  Demsetz  in  his  classic  1967  paper.    Indeed,  institutional 
arrangements for many resources, such as hard rock minerals and oil and gas reservoirs in the 
U.S.,  developed  in  a  manner  consistent  with  the  Demsetz  hypothesis  (Libecap,  1978,  2007; 
Libecap and Smith, 2002). Further in a broader context, commodity markets adjust rapidly to 
price differentials and reallocate the assets so that price gaps narrow over time.  As we will see, 
however, this process of property rights formation and price convergence is not happening as 
quickly for fresh water in the western U.S. (Young, 1986, Brewer, et al, 2008).  
There are both high resource and political costs in defining and enforcing property rights 
to water and in managing it with markets. In this paper, I examine these issues in the semi-arid 
                                                           
1 The Economist (April 8, 2009, p. 52) speculates that no more than 20 per cent of the available water can be ‘safely’ 




U.S. West where many of the intensifying demand and supply problems regarding fresh water 
are playing out. I begin by illustrating the current state of water markets in 12 western U.S. 
states.
2 We will see that there are major differences in water prices across uses (agriculture, 
urban, environmental) and that these differences appear to persist beyond what can be explained 
by differences in conveyance costs and water quality, suggesting that water markets have not 
developed fully enough to narrow the gaps.  Moreover, there is considerable difference in the 
extent and nature of water trading across the western states, suggesting that water values and 
transaction costs of trade vary considerably. I then turn to the resource and political costs of 
defining water rights and the use of markets.  In this discussion, efficiency and equity issues play 
important,  often  conflicting,  roles.   This tension  reflects  the  very  social  nature  of the  water 
resource.  
 
II. Efficiency: The Extent of Water Trading. 
A. Water Price Differentials.  
  Contemporary western water markets generally are local with trading confined within 
water basins and sectors (among adjacent irrigators, for example). Typically, exchange outside of 
a water basin is limited, and voluntary private transactions to move water from agriculture to 
urban use often is very costly, and in some cases, extremely contentious. And there is virtually 
no private water trading across state boundaries.  
  Price differences across uses illustrate the opportunity for exchange, but they are difficult 
to assemble because of segmented markets, limited comparable observations of trades within and 
across sectors, high shipping or conveyance costs, diverse regulatory regimes, and variation in 
                                                           
2 The states include California, Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Montana, Wyoming, Nevada, Arizona, New Mexico, 
Utah, Colorado, and Texas.   
 
3 
water quality. Accordingly, examining available price data must be done with caution, but the 
patterns are indicative of the thinness of many water markets and of the efficiency gains from 
further re-allocation.
3   
  Data assembled by Clay Landry and reported in Libecap (2010) for two regional markets, 
the Reno/Truckee Basin, Nevada and the South Platte Basin, Colorado, indicate significant price 
gaps between agriculture-to-urban and agricultural-to-agriculture transactions. For the Truckee 
Basin, the median price of 1,025 agriculture-to-urban water sales between 2002 and 2009 (2008 
prices) was $17,685/acre foot (an acre foot = 325,851 gallons, about enough to meet the needs of 
4 people for a year), whereas for 13 agriculture-to-agriculture sales over the same period the 
median price was $1,500/AF. For the South Platte, the median price for 138 agriculture-to-urban 
sales between 2002 and 2008 was $6,519/AF as compared to $5,309/AF for 110 agriculture-to-
agriculture transactions. 
Aggregating transactions across markets and time can compensate for limited comparable 
transactions within local markets in order to gain a sense of differences in value across sectors, 
recognizing the qualifiers noted above.  The data reported here are from a data base of 4,220 
observations from 1987 through 2008 as compiled from water transactions described in the trade 
journal,  Water  Strategist.
4  The  Water  Strategist  is  a  monthly  publication  that  details  water 
transactions, litigation, legislation, and other water marketing activities.  The journal publishes 
each month a “Transactions” section that lists, by state, various water transfers that generally 
include the year of the transfer; the acquirer and supplier of the water (both labeled variously as 
municipality,  developer,  company,  irrigator,  farmer,  rancher,  conservancy  district,  irrigation 
                                                           
3 For additional discussion of western water markets, see Libecap (2010). 
4 The dataset currently includes 4407 transactions through 2009.  Because 2009 transactions will continue to be 
indicated throughout 2010, the 2009 transactions currently in the database were excluded from the analysis, you can 
find the full dataset at: http://www.bren.ucsb.edu/news/water_transfers.htm  
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district, state, federal agency, etc.); the amount of water transferred; the proposed use of the 
water; and, if applicable, the terms, such as the price and nature (lease or sale) of the contract.
5  
The  data  set  only  includes  transactions  reported  by  the  Water  Strategist,  and  hence,  is  not 
conclusive because transactions are likely to be missed, especially those that take place within 
organizations, such as irrigation districts.
6 Even so, Water Strategist entries are among the most 
comprehensive available for across states, and hence, likely capture the general pattern of water 
trading. 
Of  the  4,220 transactions in  our data  set  with information  on  the  transacting  parties, 
amounts, and nature of use, a smaller number, 2,765, had price data.
7   Table 1 shows mean and 
median prices per acre foot (an acre foot is 326,000 gallons of water) for leases and sales for 
agriculture-to-agriculture and agriculture-to-urban trades.
 8  The prices for sales are given as the 
value per acre-foot of committed flow of water, which is analogous to a one-year lease price.
9 By 
discounting quantity flows, using the same methodology as for determining the present value of 
a perpetual bond, we calculate a single committed quantity.  With this discounted quantity we 
convert the total sales price into a per acre-foot price that is directly comparable to a per-acre-
foot, one-year lease price. Multi-year lease prices are treated similarly, using the same method as 
finding the present value of a multi-year bond and are combined with 1-year leases in Table 1.  
                                                           
5  In  developing  the  dataset, we  often have  to interpret  entries in the  Water  Strategist  where the  discussion  is 
ambiguous  in  order  to  determine  the  nature  of  the  trade.  Our  methodology  is  described  at: 
http://www.bren.ucsb.edu/news/water_transfers.htm 
6 See Brewer, et al 2008 for discussion of methodology.  
7 The disparity between the overall number of transfers in the data set, 4,220 and 2,765 is due to cases in which the 
Water Strategist did not provide price information or the entry coupled the sale of land and water into one price and 
we had no way of disentangling the two in order to determine the price of the water. 
8  We  converted  all  prices  into  dollars  per  acre-foot  of  water  for  comparison  across  time.  Prices  for  one-year 
transactions were easily presented in per acre-foot terms.  For example, if 1,000 acre-feet of water was leased for 
one year for a total price of $100,000, then the per-acre-foot price was $100. 
9 Consider a sale of 1,000 acre-feet of water for a total price of $2 million.  The per-acre foot price is $2,000. This is 
the traditional method of showing sale prices. However, it is not directly comparable to the one-year lease price 
because the sale commits a flow of water to the buyer in perpetuity.  In the example of a sale of 1,000 acre-feet of 
water for a total price of $2 million, using 5 percent to discount the quantity flows, leads to discounted sales price of 
$100 per acre-foot.    
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Based on historical use patterns, as much as 90% of western water is consumed in agriculture, 
but most new demand is for urban and environmental uses.
 10  Accordingly, the trades reported 
are for movements of water within and out of agriculture.  
 











Median Price  $74  $19  $295  $144 
Mean Price  $190  $56  $437  $246 
Number of Observations  204  207  1,140  215 
 
As shown, the annual mean and median sale and lease prices for agriculture-to-urban 
transactions  are  significantly  higher  than  are  agriculture-to-agriculture  trades  (See  statistical 
discussion below).  This condition in part indicates the benefits of out-of-sector water transfers. 
Other  factors,  such  as  more  senior  rights  that  may  be  associated  with  agriculture-to-urban 
transfers  and  higher  wheeling  or  conveyance  costs,  also  explain  the  higher  prices.  Further, 
because  sales  involve  the  transfer  of  water  rights  and  a  perpetual  claim  on  water  flows  as 
compared to leases, which involve a shorter-term (often one-year) transfer of the right to use 
water, sale prices will be higher than lease prices.  
A better sense of the price differential is shown by a case where quality and conveyance 
issues are not relevant. Groundwater for farming near Marana, Pima County, Arizona in 2006 
cost approximately $27 per acre-foot, whereas the same water supplied by Tucson Water, with 
an increasing block rate structure, cost urban customers from $479 to $3,267 per acre-foot.
11 
  Figure 1 shows the patterns for agriculture-to-agriculture and agriculture-to-urban median 
                                                           
10 http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/wateruse/ 
11 Based on personal communication with Paul Wilson, professor of agricultural economics at the University of 
Arizona; Ken Seasholes, director of the Arizona Department of Water Resources, Tucson Active Management Area; 
and Christopher Avery, Esq., Tucson City Attorney’s Office.  See Tucson City Code § 27-33. Some of the price 
difference reflects the costs of the water-delivery infrastructure necessary to provide water to urban users.  It is 
unlikely, however, that those costs account for the dramatic price difference across the two uses.  
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prices over time for sales and one-year leases. A Wilcoxon signed-rank test
12 was performed and 
the yearly median price of agriculture-to-urban transfers is greater than that of agriculture-to-
agriculture transfers at a 1 percent significance level.
13 In the dataset, agriculture-to-urban sales 
are dominated by transactions in Colorado on the Big-Thompson Project.
14  Although there are 
limited data on agriculture-to-agriculture sales outside Colorado, the median agriculture-to-urban 
sale price in the 11 western states excluding Colorado is much greater, $708/AF, than the median 
price of agriculture-to-agriculture sales, $251/AF.   
There  are  two  primary  reasons  why  there  are  fewer  observations  for  agriculture-to-
agriculture sales outside Colorado.
15  One is that agriculture-to-agriculture sales can take place 
within irrigation districts, and these transactions may not be reported in the Water Strategist.
16  
The entire 22-year dataset only reports 613 agriculture-to-agriculture trades for the 12 western 
states.  Brozovic et. al. (2002) report that in the Westlands Water District alone, where active 
intra-district trading takes place, 1,267 transactions occurred from 1993-1996.
17  The second 
reason is that irrigators in western states often rely on leases instead of sales.  A Wilcoxon signed-rank 
test was performed on 1-year lease prices for the 12 western states, of which Colorado represents a very 
small  portion  of  transactions.    The  test  shows  that  the  yearly  median  price  of  Agriculture-to-urban 




                                                           
12 The Wilcoxon signed-rank test is similar to the standard difference-in-means t-test.  However, its non-parametric 
nature allows additional flexibility as it does not require a-priori assumptions on the distribution of its components.  
The statistical significance holds for the difference in means as well. 
13 W=-183, p-value=0.0015 
14 The Colorado Big Thompson institutional details are discussed later in the text.  
15 Of the 2765 priced transactions used in this analysis, 215 were Agriculture-to-Agriculture sales, 32 of which were 
outside of CO.  In contrast, there were 1140 Agriculture-to-Urban sales with price data, with 211 taking place 
outside CO. 
16  In  Colorado  all  transactions  on  the  Big  Thompson  Project  including  agriculture-to-agriculture  are  reported, 
providing additional data. 
17 http://www.ucowr.siu.edu/updates/pdfn/V121_A2.pdf 
18 W=-158, p-value=0.003  
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Figure 1: Prices Over Time 
 
 
   
B. Welfare Gains from Greater Market Trading.  
  The differences in the prices of traded water in the two categories indicates that at the 
margin there can be significant efficiency gains from re-allocating some water from agriculture 
to urban and environmental uses.  Here we attempt to model what some of these gains might 
look like.  There are several obstacles to modeling the efficiency advantages of water trades, but 
they fall into three broad categories.  One, the physical aspects of water trades.  Water price 
depends  not  only  on  supply  and  demand  generally,  but  also  on  local  conditions  such  as 
conveyance  ability  and  water  quality.
  19  Two,  the  transaction  costs associated  with  differing 
                                                           
19 Conveyance costs can be high. Water is heavy. An acre foot of water weighs 2,719,226 pounds (325,851 gal/AF x 
8.435 pounds/gal) or 1,360 tons. Conveyance costs can be high. Hansen, Howitt and Williams (2007, 3) report that  
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regulations and incomplete property rights regimes across jurisdictions. Regulations vary by state 
and within states there can be county restrictions on transfers. Three, because water markets are 
local due to conveyance costs and regulatory restrictions, they are thin so that there are limited 
observations for transfers and prices, and these data can be affected by observations that are not 
indicative of general patterns.    
  To  see  this,  Figure  1  shows  agriculture-to-agriculture  sales  prices  approximating 
agriculture-to-urban prices from 2006-2008.  The high-priced agriculture-to-agriculture sales in 
these  years,  however,  took  place  within  the  Colorado  Big-Thompson  project,  where 
administrative rules allow agriculture-to-agriculture and agriculture-to-urban transfers to occur 
freely, forcing agricultural users to pay the full opportunity cost of the water, which is the cost 
urban users are willing to pay.  For example, the January 2007 issue of Water Strategist reported 
a number of trades from the Colorado Big-Thompson project, among them a transfer from an 
irrigator to a developer for $9,673 and from an irrigator to another irrigator for $9,626.   
  Given  the  observed  differences  in  water  values  between  agriculture  and  urban 
applications, it is interesting to estimate what the welfare gain might be under varying scenarios 
of a hypothetical increase in water trading from the agriculture to urban sector. We consider two 
cases: 1). if just a small amount (1%) of current irrigation water or 10 % of the current urban 
market, which ever were smaller, or 2). if 3% of irrigation water or 100 % of the current urban 
market, which ever were smaller, were transferred to urban use. These constraints are designed 
to minimize any impact on agricultural or urban sector water prices and to reflect what might be 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
55 percent of the $250 that the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California paid in 2002 for water from 




feasible for an urban market to absorb.
20 Kenny, et al (2009) provide estimates of the total and 
irrigated use of water in the U.S. by state and the Bren data set allows for trading estimates.  
  The state data are reported in Table 2, which provides estimates of total surface water 
used and in irrigation as of 2005, as well as the average committed volume of water transferred 
per year through all trades--sales, multi-year leases, and one-year leases, and that figure as a 
share of total use and irrigation use.
21 The final column lists the median price difference between 
agriculture-to-urban and agriculture-to-agriculture transfers.  
  Table 3 outlines the hypothetical transfers.  Note that the volume of water in the proposed 
additional transfers is small compared to the water used for irrigation or to total current transfers. 
Column two shows the value of current water transfers; column three the proposed increase 
under option (1); the associated welfare gain and its share of current transfers are in columns four 





















                                                           
20 We assume that the additional transfers take place at the prevailing agriculture to urban market price. The net gain 
is this value, less the opportunity cost of water in agriculture as approximated by the agriculture-to-agriculture price.   
21 As with discussed for Table 1, we convert all contracted amounts of water to a similar committed flow.   
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Table 2: Surface Water Use (2005) and Average Water Trading Volume, Western US 1987-2008 




State  Total (AF)
23  Irrigation (AF)  Average 
Volume (AF)
24 
As % of Total 
Use 











AZ  3,154,970  2,540,000  1,056,749  33.5%  41.6%  $17 
CA  22,087,390  15,700,000  1,939,336  8.8%  12.4%  $30 
CO  10,984,830  10,000,000  779,478  7.1%  7.8%  $232 
ID  15,169,140  12,700,000  491,005  3.2%  3.9%  N.A. 
MT  9,736,660  9,530,000  28,698  0.3%  0.3%  $45 
NV  1,374,870  828,000  118,677  8.6%  14.3%  $175 
NM  1,611,860  1,550,000  221,979  13.8%  14.3%  $54 
OR  5,077,910  3,780,000  442,625  8.7%  11.7%  $10 
TX  6,695,160  1,680,000  1,735,658  25.9%  103.3%  $15 
UT  4,117,390  3,610,000  228,932  5.6%  6.3%  $22 
WA  3,765,180  2,890,000  183,402  4.9%  6.3%  $25 
WY  3,663,120  3,570,000  48,835  1.3%  1.4%  $77 
Total  87,438,480  68,378,000  7,275,374  8.3%  10.6%   
  
  The net welfare gain from moving a very small amount of water to urban users under (1) 
is estimated at $12 million per year and under (2) at $98 million per year. These figures represent 
gains of 3% and 24% of the value of the yearly water market activity of almost $406 million. 
Even under the conservative conditions imposed in this exercise, there are significant annual 
welfare gains from increased movement of water from agriculture to urban uses.  Any increases 
                                                           
22 Using committed amounts makes sense because it reflects the full amount of water obligated under the contract. 
Using the annual flow of the first year of the contract would under state the amount of water involved. See Brewer et 
al (2008). 
23  Excluding  water  used  for  thermoelectric  cooling.    This  category  includes  surface  water  use  for  public 
consumption, agriculture (irrigation, livestock, and aquaculture), industry, and mining. 
24 Average volume is the sum of all committed flows transferred in each year, averaged over the 22-year period 
recorded in the dataset.  Water Strategist data measures transactions occurring in each year, but many of these 
transactions are for multiple years.  Although we might say 10,000 AF was transferred in 2008, we really mean the 
discounted sum of committed flows for the duration of the transaction is 10,000 AF in 2008—some of the flows are 
actually transferred in later years.  This allows for a consistent treatment of prices.  
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in trading are constrained by the existing (already small) size of the urban market. The estimates 
are illustrative only and some of the very large gains, such as in Colorado, Montana, Nevada, and 
Washington may be partially due to limited observations for agriculture-to-agriculture trades in 
the data set. Nevertheless, they indicate the potential benefits of a more active water market. We 
now turn to a discussion of the nature of the current water market. 
 







































Gain as % of 
Current 
Market Value 
AZ  $38,811,748  25,400  $440,362  1%  76,200   $1,321,087   3% 
CA  $223,477,457  71,126  $2,135,504  1%  471,000   $14,141,453   6% 
CO  $40,819,066  31,084  $7,224,465  18%  300,000   $69,725,433   171%
30 
ID  $5,194,129  N.A.  N.A.  N.A.  40,710   $0     
MT  $294,998  1,186  $53,692  18%  11,858   $536,920   182% 
NV  $4,191,448  2,185  $382,668  9%  21,854   $3,826,683   91% 
NM  $36,334,302  14,570  $782,415  2%  46,500   $2,497,023   7% 
OR  $10,014,045  151  $1,456  0%  1,509   $14,562   0% 
TX  $39,093,722  16,800  $251,868  1%  50,400   $755,604   2% 
UT  $6,328,674  17,820  $388,094  6%  108,300   $2,358,663   37% 
WA  $1,097,697  9,016  $225,025  20%  86,700   $2,163,814   197% 
WY  $267,649  772  $59,365  22%  7,721   $593,651   222% 




                                                           
25 Differences that occur are the result of rounding. 
26 This is the sum of the total price of every transaction from 1987-2008 in 2008 dollars divided by 22 years to arrive 
at a yearly average. 
27 1% of surface irrigation water in AZ and TX, and 10% of current agriculture to urban market for CA, CO, MT, 
NV, NM, OR, UT, WA, WY. 
28 Net welfare gain is price difference (Ag-to-Urban minus Ag-to-Ag) multiplied by volume of additional transfers. 
29 Transfer Minimum of 3% Irrigation Volume, or 100% Current Urban Market Volume, whichever was smaller. 
30 The large welfare gain as shown in Colorado likely reflects the difference in high prices paid for water within the 
Colorado-Big Thompson District discussed below and   
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C. Water Transfers in 12 Western States 1987-2008. 
  All western  states  allow  for transfers  of  water.    There  are  three  types  of  transfers—
permanent sales of water rights, short-term leases (1 year), and longer-term leases (up to 35 years 
or  more).  Among  these,  there  are  transfers  among  those  who  use  the  water  for  the  same   
purpose—irrigated  agriculture  for  example,  or  among  those  with  different  purposes—
agriculture-to-urban or  environmental, and transfers within a water basin (where sources are 
interrelated geologically) or across basins—out of one water region to another. Short-term leases 
within a basin among those who use water for the same purpose, such as farmers, typically have 
been the most common. Longer-term leases and sales of water rights often involve changes in the 
location and nature of use of water. 
Figure 2 illustrates the yearly path of all transfers in the 12 western states from 1987 
through  2008  as  well  as  those  for  agriculture-to-agriculture,  agriculture-to-urban,  and 
agriculture-to-environmental  trades.  The  figure  shows  that:  (1)  the  total  number  of  water 
transfers  is  increasing  (statistically  significant);  (2)  agriculture-to-urban  and  agriculture-to-
environmental trades are also rising (statistically significant); and (3) agriculture-to-agriculture 














                                                           
31 Given that Colorado dominates the number of transactions, we note that the trends remain the same in terms of 





  Table 3 shows the nature of trades across states and by contract form from 1987 through 
2008.    Colorado  dominates  in  terms  of  total  market  transactions,  reflecting  the  institutional 
advantages of the Colorado-Big Thompson Project, which are described below and where most 
of  the  transactions  are  sales.  Other  active  market  states  are  California,  Texas,  Arizona,  and 
Nevada.  Within  California  and  Texas  short-term  leases  are  the  most  prevalent  contract,  but 
multi-year leases and sales are also important. California’s water institutional and regulatory 
environments explain the focus on short-term leases.  In Arizona and Nevada, rapidly urbanizing, 
dry states, sales are common, but, not surprisingly, Montana and Wyoming, the least urban of the 
12 western states, have the fewest water sales.  
  Table  4  breaks  down  the  trading  activity  by  state  into  the  share  that  is  within  the 
agriculture or urban sectors and that which is from agriculture to urban.  The differences between 
the annual flow and committed measures reflect the importance of sales and long-term leases in 
the latter.  Again, there are important differences across the states.  Among the leading water 
trading  states,  Arizona  and  California  have  relatively  balanced  transactions  in  recorded  
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transactions, but Colorado, Texas, Nevada, and Washington show considerable activity to and 
within the urban sector.  
 
Table 3 











Arizona  233  158  46  12 
California  656  108  317  77 
Colorado  2,144  1,804  97  43 
Idaho  148  31  107  3 
Montana  46  3  14  26 
New Mexico  153  73  59  15 
Nevada  192  148  4  4 
Oregon  125  24  56  25 
Texas  320  91  141  71 
Utah  84  61  15  7 
Washington  57  24  23  9 
Wyoming  62  6  41  5 
Total  4,220  2,531  920  297 
 
Table 4 

























Urban  (Million AF) 
AZ  15%  46%  39%  8.34  31%  37%  32%  21.72 
CA  41%  32%  27%  5.04  37%  32%  31%  12.60 
CO  51%  29%  20%  0.59  75%  8%  17%  5.88 
ID  39%  55%  6%  1.59  29%  67%  5%  2.36  
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MT  55%  45%  0%  0.02  95%  5%  0%  0.22 
NM  15%  78%  7%  0.10  36%  55%  10%  0.91 
NV  84%  0%  16%  0.22  72%  0%  28%  2.39 
OR  0%  100%  0%  0.10  0%  100%  0%  0.29 
TX  48%  15%  37%  1.75  50%  3%  47%  25.30 
UT  38%  32%  29%  0.31  53%  3%  44%  4.05 
WA  49%  36%  15%  0.16  79%  3%  18%  1.93 
WY  37%  63%  0%  0.10  38%  62%  0%  0.41 
 
  As indicated above there is water market activity across the western states, and there are 
opportunities for more activity to address growing problems of scarcity and reallocation. The 
question is what measurement and equity issues will be encountered? To address these issues, we 
first turn to water rights.  
 
III. Western Water Rights 
Appropriative Surface Water Rights. 
  In western states, individuals do not own water as they might own land. This in itself is 
suggestive of the special nature of water.  The state owns the water, which it holds in trust for its 
citizens. Individuals hold usufruct rights to the water, subject to the requirement that the use be 
beneficial and reasonable and to oversight by the state in monitoring use and water transfers to 
insure that they are consistent with the public interest (Gould, 1995, 94; Simms 1995, 321).  
Accordingly,  there  is  a  broad  regulatory  framework  for  water  so  that  western  water  rights 
potentially have less protection and are more fragile than most other property rights (Sax 1990, 
260; Gray 1994b, 262).   
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  In most western states--Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah 
and Wyoming--all surface water rights are based on the prior appropriation doctrine that allows 
rights holders to withdraw a certain amount of water from a natural water course for beneficial 
purposes on land remote from the point of diversion (Getches, 1997, 74-189).  The appropriative 
doctrine emerged in the 19th century in response to the development of mining and agriculture in 
the semi-arid West where growing numbers of people and economic activities were increasingly 
concentrated  in  areas  where  there  was  too  little  water  (Kanazawa,  1998).  Prior  appropriation 
allowed water  to  be  separated  from  riparian  land and  moved  via  canals and ditches  to new 
locations (Johnson, Gisser, and Werner, 1981). 
Appropriative rights are assigned through the rule of first possession or priority of claim. 
They grant rights to redirect a defined quantity of water from the source, based on the time of the 
initial diversion. Those with the earliest water claims have the highest priority and those with 
subsequent claims have lower-priority or junior claims. As such, there is a ladder of rights on a 
stream,  ranging  from  highest  in  priority  to  the  lowest.  This  allocative  mechanism  ranks 
competing claimants based on priority in order to ration water during times of drought.  
  Appropriative rights are to a fixed quantity of water to be diverted from the water source 
(surface or ground water), but transfers of water that change the point of diversion, timing, or 
nature of use generally are based on the amount of water consumed (MacDonnell, 1990, Vol. I, p. 
11).
 32  
  Under prior appropriation there is a critical interdependence among diverters from the 
same water source with different priority rights. Because as much as 50 percent of the original 
                                                           
32 Anderson and Johnson (1986) and Johnson, et al (1981). Johnson, et al describe how specifying a property right in 
water in terms of consumptive use with options for third-party grievances can be an effective method for promoting 
transfers.  Howitt and Hansen (2005, 60) point to both transaction costs through property rights and regulatory 
differences and often high costs of transporting water. See also Smith (2008) for discussion of water rights in a 
semicommons setting.    
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diversion  may  flow  back  to  the  stream  or  percolate  down  to  the  aquifer,  it  is  available  for 
subsequent users (Young, 1986, 1144). During times of drought when only senior appropriators 
may have their allotments fulfilled, junior appropriators are  especially  dependent upon these 
return flows. They bear most of the downside risk of drought. Actions by senior rights holders 
that  affect  water  consumption  and  can  influence  the  amount  of  water  released  downstream. 
Accordingly, water trading from agriculture to urban uses that involves export out of the basin 
can impair third parties and is subject to state regulation to insure that no harm is inflicted on 
junior diverters (Getches, 1997, 161). This is an issue to which we will return. 
Riparian Surface Water Rights. 
  In the eastern states, water rights are based on ownership of land appurtenant to water 
flows.   Riparian land owners have rights to access the water adjacent to or passing through their 
properties for reasonable use, including fishing and navigation, and can utilize the water so long 
as doing so does not harm other riparian claimants downstream (Getches 1997, 33).  In cases of 
drought, all parties share in the reduced water flow. Riparian water rights are tied to the land can 
only be transferred with adjacent properties.  
  Of the 12 western states examined here, the wettest states, California, Texas, Oregon, and 
Washington have a hybrid of prior appropriation and riparian systems, whereas the drier 8 states 
have prior appropriation only (Getches 1997, 8). When the two systems operate, there can be 
questions of priority of claim when diversion under the appropriative system seriously reduces 
the water available to riparian owners. Alternatively, riparian claims could prohibit diversion 
from streams as part of appropriative water claims. In western states, riparian claims have been 
limited,  although  in  California  they  are  given  precedence  in  disputes  with  appropriative 




  Groundwater rights vary across the western states and most are not as well defined as are 
surface water rights (Thompson 1993, 684).  Most groundwater rights allow surface land owners 
access  to  a  reasonable  use  of  groundwater  (Getches  1997,  251).  With  multiple,  fragmented 
surface properties and the vague standard of reasonable use groundwater basins can be subject to 
competitive withdrawal and classic common-pool conditions.
33
  
  These are the basic water rights in the western U.S. Their definition and enforcement are 
affected by the physical characteristics of water, regulatory standards, and the many parties that 
have a say in the exchange of any water right.  
 
IV. The Physical Characteristics of Water: Property Rights, Equity and Public Interest 
Demands.  
 
  Because  of  its  fluid  nature  and  that  fact  that  many  parties  use  water  sequentially  or 
simultaneously, there are significant resource and political costs in defining private water rights.  
To see the effects of its physical characteristics, it is useful to compare water with land, which is 
fixed and observable, and with mobile, wild-ocean fish stocks, which are mobile like water, with 
regard to characteristics that affect the costs of defining and enforcing property rights.
34 Table 5 
lists the three resources and the characteristics--ability to bound, partition, and exclude; measure 
size and amount; variability of supply; existence of simultaneous and sequential uses. The signs 
reported in each cell indicate how the characteristic impacts the costs of definition of property 
rights for the resource, with a plus sign indicating that it contributes to definition and a negative 
                                                           
33 Provencher and Burt (1993), Glennon (2002, 209-24). For similarities with oil pools, see Libecap (1989, 93-114). 
34  For  discussion  of  property  rights  in  land,  see  Ellickson  (1993,  1327  for  discussion  of  ease  of  monitoring 
boundaries; 1362-3 for discussion of the bundle of property rights in land; 1381 for discussion of partitioning land 
across private and public uses.   
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sign indicating that it hinders definition.  As can be seen, water is more similar to migratory fish 
stocks than to land in terms of the costs of bounding, exclusion, and measurement.  
 
Table 5 
Resource Characteristics  











Land  +  +  +  +  + 
Fish 
Stocks 
-  -  -  -  - 
Water   -  -  -  -  - 
 
 
The Costs of Bounding. 
  Because it is a liquid, surface and groundwater cannot be bounded or partitioned easily 
across claimants and uses (Smith, 2008).  This characteristic is also generally true for fisheries, 
where  numerous  competing  fishers  can  exploit  the  same  mobile  stock  as  an  open-access 
resource.
35 Ownership to both resources is granted only upon extraction (diversion for water, 
harvest  for  fish)  under  the  rule  of  capture.  Stationary  land  is  fixed  and  observable  so  that 
bounding costs are much lower. It is possible to fence and partition land to meet concurrent and 
sequential demands for farming, urban development, pastoral scenery or other amenities, such as 
provision of wildlife habitat.  
 
The Costs of Measurement. 
  Fluidity and in the case of groundwater, a lack of observability, also raise the costs of 
measuring a water right. For this reason, ownership is based on the amount diverted or pumped 
                                                           
35 See Hannesson (2004).  
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(Johnson, et al, 1981, 279). The amount actually diverted, however, varies over time due to 
fluctuating  precipitation  that  affects  stream  flow,  reservoir  size,  and  groundwater  recharge. 
Seasonal precipitation patterns generally are predictable and can be incorporated into a water 
claim, but long-term variation due to drought is less predictable, adding uncertainty to water 
supply and diversion amounts associated with a water right.   
  Mobile, unobserved fish stocks have comparable measurement problems. The stock is 
affected by natural growth (recruitment), disease, ocean temperature, food supplies, pollution, 
and harvest in ways that are often poorly understood. As a result, rights to fish or catch shares 
such as individual transferable quotas (ITQs), are based on the percent of the annual allowable 
catch, not to a fixed amount of fish.
36 In contrast, there is no comparable problem for measuring 
fixed, observable land plots, where rights can be well defined with more certainty. 
 
The Interconnected Private and Public Goods Characteristics of Water. 
  Because water diverters sequentially access the same (unconsumed) water and because 
there are associated amenity, riparian, and aquatic habitat values often simultaneously supplied, 
private and public water uses are intertwined to an extent not found for land or  fish stocks 
(Smith, 2008; Hanemann, 2006). The interconnected nature of water uses and values is a basis 
for state regulation of water rights and water trades.  Although public goods or public interest 
claims have merit, these equity concepts can be so broad and elastic that they can be asserted in 
the  political  and  judicial  processes  by  special  interests  to  weaken  property  rights  and  the 
efficiency benefits they can provide for incentives for wise use, conservation, and exchange.     
 
                                                           
36 The New Zealand quota system began by assigning fixed amounts of fish, but was changed to a percentage of 
allowable catch. See Connor and Shallard (2010, 349).  
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V.  Regulatory Constraints and Water Rights.  
 
Beneficial Use, Diversion Requirements, Preferential Uses 
  Appropriative water rights are conditional upon placing the water into beneficial use--the 
use-it-or-lose-it  mandate  and  no  injury  to  third  parties.  Beneficial  use  was  included  in  the 
appropriative doctrine as a low-cost way of determining if there was excess water to be assigned. 
Most western states define beneficial use generally as a use for the benefit of the appropriator, 
other  persons,  or  the  public  with  corresponding  lists  of  what  is  considered  beneficial  use. 
Preferred applications vary somewhat across the states. Although, irrigation was the dominant 
initial basis for diversion, the set of beneficial uses can be expanded or contracted based on 
changing public values, judicial interpretations, and constituent group politics.  For example, 
leaving water instream for habit recently has been accepted as a beneficial use across the states 
although its exact definition differs among them (Getches, 1997, 113-4).
37   
  The vague concept of beneficial use provides the basis for a potentially broad regulatory 
mandate  (Getches,  1997,  128-9).    Because  of  this,  the  determination  of  beneficial  use  and 
diversion  requirements  consistent  with  it  make  water  rights  vulnerable  to  shifting  legal  and 
political interpretations, adding uncertainty to the water right.  Historically, physical diversion 
and complete use of diverted water was deemed consistent with the doctrine and maintenance of 
a water right.  But it has motivated irrigators to place water into low-valued applications, even 
though its use elsewhere might have higher values. Further, until recent changes in state law 
recognized conserved water as consistent with beneficial use, irrigators avoided conservation. 
Any conserved water could be interpreted as evidence of a lack of beneficial use of the past 
allotment and therefore be subject to claiming by other diverters (Getches, 1997, 128).   
                                                           
37 See Anderson and Johnson (1986) and Scarborough (2010) on instream flows.  
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The "No Injury" Rule (Third Party Effects), Area of Origin Restrictions 
  Third  party  impairments  are  technical  impacts  resulting  from  the  consecutive  use  of 
water. As noted above, changes in the timing, location, and nature of use can affect the amount 
and quality of water consumed or released to the stream for subsequent users or uses. In this 
event,  junior  rights  holders  especially  could  be  harmed,  and  this  is  known  as  third-party 
impairment or a third-party effect. The prospect of third-party impairment has led western states 
to implement judicial or administrative procedures that must be followed before water use can be 
altered  or  water  rights  transferred.  Although  these  procedures  vary  from  state  to  state,  they 
typically allow water use changes or water rights transfers only if there is no damage to other 
water  rights  holders,  the  "no  injury  rule"  (Thompson  1993,  701;).  Water  transfers  that  are 
unlikely to have these impacts, such as trades among adjacent irrigators, typically do not require 
state approval because any third-party impairment is minimal.  
  As  a  result,  most  trades  that  could  impact  release  flows  must  be  approved  by  state 
regulatory agencies. Petitions for trade must specify the amount of water involved, the duration 
of  the  contract,  the  timing  of  the  exchange,  the  type  of  water  right,  consumptive  use,  and 
possibly hydraulic and other legal information. The agency evaluates the proposal to determine 
whether third-party effects are involved. Notice of the proposed change is published so that 
objections to the change may be filed.  The burden of proof of no harm from the transfer usually 
rests  with  the  applicant.  The  outcome  of  administrative  review  includes  approval,  approval 
subject to modification, or denial, as well as provision of opportunities for appeal (Colby, 1995, 
114).
38 
                                                           
38  See also Colby, Bonnie G., Mark A. McGinnis, Ken Rait (1989) and Colby (1990).  
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  Any  objections  by  junior  appropriators  downstream  or  others  may  be  resolved  by 
adjustments  in  the  amount  of  water,  timing,  or  allowable  uses  in  the  exchange.  Monetary 
payments or other forms of compensation also may be included.  The resolution of other third 
party complaints, however, may not be so straightforward. If substantial amounts of farm land 
are fallowed, there could be reduction in local demand for farm labor and in wholesale and retail 
trade  within  rural  communities.  Assessing  the  legitimacy,  basis,  and  appropriate  size  of 
compensation to be paid for possible pecuniary impacts on farm labor and local merchants is 
complicated. There  must be agreement on the damages, who should pay, and the terms and 
conditions of payment. All of these are likely to be controversial, and they potentially weaken 
water rights and reduce the gains from water reallocation.
39   
  Additional third-party claims are apt to be even more difficult to assess. Rural politicians 
may  find  their  political  base  eroded  if  large  water  transfers  led  to  a  decline  in  agricultural 
activities.   Other local officials, including school district administrators and county extension 
agents  may  be  similarly  affected.    Because  these  damages  are  hard  to  measure,  monetary 
payments would be difficult to determine, and more importantly, under current law and political 
practices would be illegal. Accordingly, local politicians and bureaucratic officials may have an 
incentive to oppose water trades in their own self interest as well as in the interest of other 
constituencies who may be harmed.  
  Despite these concerns, most studies suggest that third-party pecuniary effects will be 
small. Only limited amounts of water and fallowing are involved in most transactions. Water 
placed in low-valued uses is traded first, and as the amount of water involved increases, its 
marginal  value  rises.    As  water  prices  increase,  alternative  urban  and  environmental  users 
demand less. And there are monetary and efficiency benefits from the sale and more efficient use 
                                                           
39 For examination of bargaining over pecuniary benefits of water transfers, see Libecap (2008).  
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of water (Hanak, 2003 p. x-xii, 72; Howitt, 1994). Hanak (2003, 81) points out that effects of 
fallowing irrigated farmland are likely to have no more than a one percent effect on overall 
county economic activity, even when payments for economic adjustments are not included.  
  Third-party impairment can be a legitimate concern given the sequential uses of the same 
water by junior appropriative rights holders.  At the same time, how it affects water rights and 
water transfers depends upon how the problem is interpreted legally and the range for objections. 
If third-party impairment is strictly defined and limited to downstream, junior rights holders, 
who  would  feel  a  direct  impact,  then  regulatory  review  is  consistent  with  efficiency.  If  the 
problem is broadly defined to include multiple other constituencies and claims of harm, then 
inefficient rent-seeking becomes more probable, particularly given the high prices offered for 
water in some cases.    
  The regulatory process varies across the western states—in part reflecting the differential 
complexity  of  water  supply  and  use  and  in  part  reflecting  different  supply  and  demand 
conditions. Two examples are provided to illustrate the process of regulation within the states.  
  California generally has pro-transfer legislation, but the regulatory and property rights 
environments are less supportive. These include mixed jurisdictions among state and federal 
agencies,  a  patchwork  of  county  regulations  of  groundwater  withdrawal  and  export,  and  a 
complex system of water rights with differential requirements for agency review (Gray 1994a, 
178).  For example, only transfers of surface water rights acquired since 1914 require approval of 
the State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB).  Exchanges within the huge Central Valley 
Project  (CVP),  where  the  Federal  Bureau  of  Reclamation  has  jurisdiction,  usually  involving 
short-term agricultural water trades, do not involve the SWRCB (MacDonnell (1990, Vol. I, 17-
8, 24, Vol. II, Gray, 3-13).  Because there so many irrigation districts and supply organizations  
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within the CVP with interlaced claims to water, any transfer by one entity to outside buyers is apt 
to  affect  another  claimant,    triggering  a  regulatory  review.  The  SWRCB  also  can  deny  a 
proposed water transfer if would “unreasonably affect the overall economy of the area from 
which the water is being transferred.”
40
 As a result, the administrative process of transferring 
water in California can be lengthy and complex, and the outcome uncertain.  
  Further, California counties are able to restrict extraction and export of groundwater out 
of county through area-of-origin restrictions. As of 2002, 22 of 58 counties had done so (Hanak, 
2003, vii; Gray, 1994a, 180; Hanak and Dyckman, 2003).  These county ordinances similarly can 
limit surface water transactions if they appear to diminish groundwater resources, either through 
lowered  recharge  or  through  greater  farmer  reliance  upon  pumping.  Although  there  are 
legitimate groundwater issues at stake, recent research by Hanak (2003, viii) suggests that the 
overriding aim of the ordinances is to keep water within rural counties and limit reallocation to 
urban or environmental uses.  
  In  Colorado  there  are  different  regulatory  structures  for  the  Northern  Colorado 
Conservancy District that manages Colorado Big Thompson (CBT) water and for other parts of 
the  state.  In  most  of  Colorado,  water  courts  handle  impairment  claims  for  proposed  water 
transactions. In the CBT, the courts do not have jurisdiction. Unlike more common appropriative 
water rights, within the CBT each water right holder has the same priority and legal claim to a 
number of uniform water units that are tradable.  The amount of water in each unit fluctuates 
annually based on water supply. All shareholders are adjusted in the same manner. Return flows 
from  any  diversion  are  captured  by  the  district  so  that  all  diversion  effects  are  internalized 
district wide.  Because shares are homogenous, transfers across users, especially across sectors, 
                                                           




occur with minimal fees and paperwork (Thompson, 1993, 719; Carey and Sunding, 2001, 305).  
In effect the Colorado Big Thompson has a cap-and-trade framework and has by far the most 
active water market in the West in terms of numbers of trades. Sales prices for all uses are 
comparable as they should be when opportunity costs are incorporated, water quality and right 
priority are the same, and transaction costs are low.
41 
 
Public Resource, Public interest, Public Trust 
  For many, water is so critical and uses of it so complex, that there are calls for it to be a 
public resource (Bates, Wilkinson, MacDonnell, and Getches, 1993, 185): “A hard look at water 
policy should seek distributional fairness. . . . The public, through some acceptable process, must 
first decide which waters are for public use and which are available for private use within a 
market system. . . . [Private] appropriation ought to be limited to the amount that is not needed 
by the whole community for the satisfaction of public values.” Similarly, Dellapenna (2005, 35) 
argues  that  the  best  option  is  to  “treat  water  as  inherently  public  property  for  which  basic 
allocation decisions must be made by public agencies.”  
  To the extent that these equity demands are based on the public goods nature of water, 
then they have to be weighed in the assignment and trade of private water rights.  Indeed, most 
western  states  require  administrative  agencies  to  consider  the  public  interest  in  reviewing 
applications for new water rights (Bretson and Hill, 2009, 745). To the extent, instead, they are 
used primarily by certain parties to constrain existing property rights and water trades in their 
behalf,  there  can  be  important  efficiency  implications.  The  broader  the  interpretation  of  the 
                                                           
41  For  example,  sample  agriculture-to-urban  and  agriculture-to-agriculture  sales  were  priced  at  $9,350  and 
$9,300/unit respectively, as reported in the October 2008 Water Strategist, p. 7. The CBT also has the advantage of 
using water stored in a reservoirs, imported from elsewhere, providing a less complex case than when flowing 
streams are the water sources (Hansen and Howitt, 2005, 60).    
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public interest in water, the weaker the private interest in it and the ability of property rights to 
avoid  open-access  conditions,  to  channel  the  resource to  higher  valued  uses  through  market 
exchange, and to encourage conservation and investment.
42 
  As  the  public  interest  is  expanded  to  include  a  more  expansive  array  of  uses  and 
constituencies, many of which may be only loosely defined, more parties may assert a basis for 
disputing ownership and potential trades.  As regulatory-based transaction costs rise, water will 
flow less easily to higher valued uses, underscoring the persistent differences in water prices 
indicated in Table 1 and Figure 1 above.   
  It can be claimed legitimately that certain public goods values will not be reflected in 
market  prices.  Those  claims  require  careful  consideration  and  there  are  techniques,  such  as 
contingent valuation, for assessing non-market values.  Under those circumstances, water could 
be purchased by state agencies or non government organizations for public good applications.  
This  practice  occurs,  for  example,  in  purchases  or  leases  of  water  for  instream  flows  by 
organizations such as the Oregon Water Trust (Neuman, 2004, Scarborough, 2010). The value of 
such transactions is that the opportunity cost of water becomes clearer. This information affects 
both  the  behavior  of  current  water  rights  holders  as  sellers  (often  irrigators)  and  instream 
purchasers, so that more water is smoothly transferred without costly  controversy to higher-
valued uses.      
  A  broader  public  interest  mandate  also  means  that  more  allocative  and  management 
decisions necessarily will be directed to the state and the political process.  The record of state 
regulation  of  open-access  fisheries,  for  example,  is  not  one  of  success,  and  privatization  of 
fisheries has resulted in significant rebounds of the stock (Costello, et al 2008).  Whether or not 
                                                           
42 Public access conflicts are examples of the efficiency/equity tradeoffs that exist in the West. In one case, at least, 




this same result would apply for water remains to be seen, but the call for a wide interpretation of 
the  public  interest  and  hence,  greater  state  ownership  and  management  should  consider  the 
conditions under which this institutional arrangement would be effective.   
  As part of this evaluation, more attention should be directed toward constituent group 
politics and the determinants of political and bureaucratic decision making in the process of 
effective water management (Peltzman, 1976; Becker, 1983).  In light of possible climate change 
and growing scarcity of water, the social losses of inefficient water management and allocation 
could be high.   
  A concept related to the public interest is the public trust doctrine, which is a common 
law principle creating the legal right of the public to utilize certain lands and waters, such as 
tidewaters  or  navigable  rivers,  and  other  waters  and  natural  resources  with  high  amenity  or 
public goods values (Getches, 1997, 217, 224-8). Under the doctrine, the rights of the public are 
vested in the state as owner of the resource and trustee of its proper use. In a far-reaching ruling 
by the California Supreme Court in 1983 in the Mono Lake case (National Audubon Society v. 
Superior Court 685 P.2d 709, 712) the court stated that the “core of the public trust doctrine is 
the state’s authority as sovereign to exercise a continuous supervision and control over” the 
waters  of  the  state.”  The  doctrine  can  be  applied  retrospectively  to  roll  back  preexisting 
appropriative  rights  that  appear  inconsistent  with  the  public  trust.    There  apparently  is  no 
constitutional  basis  for  taking  challenges  of  public  trust  restrictions  of  private  water  rights 
(Simms, 1995, 321; Sax 1990, 264, 269).
43  
  Because  water  is  a  mixed  resource providing  private  and  public  goods,  there  can  be 
justifiable concerns about private water use that potentially harm public values. The benefits of 
public trust interventions, however, have to be weighed carefully against the value of the private 
                                                           
43 See also, Blumm and Schwartz (1995).   
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uses to be restricted or prohibited. The doctrine is so elastic and potentially expansive that it can 
lead  to  extensive  government  intrusion  in  water  rights.  The  doctrine,  then,  potentially  adds 
uncertainty to water ownership, weakening existing property rights and their ability to promote 
investment, trade, and efficient use of water.  
 
V.  The Parties Involved in Water Transactions. 
  Although water rights holders and prospective purchasers or lessees are key parties in any 
exchange, other institutions play key decision-making roles in the timing and extent of water 
trades.  Their  actions  affect  the  transaction  costs  of  exchange  and  the  development  of  water 
markets.  The  institutional  complexity  surrounding  water  rights  and  marketing  far  exceeds 
anything comparable for land and even perhaps for fisheries with their myriad mixes of fishers, 
processors, state, federal, and international management organizations. 
 
State Regulatory Agencies, Water Supply Organizations, Indian Tribes  
  We have already discussed the role of state regulatory agencies that must approve water 
transactions.  Additionally, there are approximately 1,127 water supply organizations across 17 
western states.
44These institutions vary widely in terms of governance structure, membership, 
decision-making authority, and water rights. Many hold water rights in trust for their members, 
whereas in some others the rights are held by the users. The organizations range from irrigation 
districts, mutual ditch  and reservoir companies, water conservancy  districts, municipal water 
districts to water companies. This organizational complexity increases the number of decision 
                                                           
44 Water User’s Organization Roster, US Department of Interior. Bureau of Reclamation, as well as state agency 
Sites; Leshy (1982).  
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rules and the transaction costs of defining clear property rights and of transferring water (Bretson 
and Hill, 2009).  
  For example, the governing boards of irrigation districts, the most common type of water 
supply institution, can be elected by members or by community voters. The voting rule can affect 
how the board responds to water transfer requests.  Districts where members elect the governing 
board appear to respond more quickly to changes in water values and water market opportunities 
than do districts where the governing board is elected community wide, where the interests are 
very heterogeneous and equity issues loom large.  
  The differential experiences of the Palo Verde (PVID) and Imperial Irrigation Districts 
(IID)  in  negotiations  to  sell  or  lease  water  are  illustrative.  The  PVID  Board  is  elected  by 
members only whereas the IID Board is elected by community voters. In the case of publically-
elected boards, members may be much less interested in selling or leasing water under their 
jurisdiction than are land owners (Thompson, 1993, 678, 728, 740; Eden, et. al, 2008; and Rosen 
and Sexton, 1993). The PVID board reached agreement to fallow land and transfer water for 
urban  use  with  little  controversy,  whereas  the  IID  board  was  mired  in  lengthy,  complex 
negotiations.
45  
  In addition to irrigation districts, the Federal Bureau of Reclamation is often involved in 
any water exchange. The Federal Bureau of Reclamation is the largest wholesaler of water in the 
U.S. and it provides irrigation water for 140,000 farms covering 10,000 acres in 17 western 
states. It has over 600 dams and reservoirs to capture and divert water, historically, mostly for 
irrigation.
46  The  Bureau  provides  water  to  the  irrigation  districts  through  long-term  service 
                                                           
45 Haddad (2000, 77, 95-116); Northwest Economic Associates (2004, 1-5); Hanak (2003, 72-3); Thompson (1993, 
729, 757) and Glennon (2010, 258-71) discuss the Imperial Irrigation District’s negotiations with San Diego and the 
MWD. 
46  www.pvid.org/; http://www.usbr.gov/main/about/  
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contracts. The Bureau can hold an appropriative right to the water within a reclamation project 
and the water is distributed anywhere within the project. The agency historically has had uneven 
policies toward water transfers (Thompson, 1993, 719-23).  It also can arbitrarily adjust water 
deliveries to farmers in response to competing demands, such as under the Endangered Species 
Act, without legal impairment to their perceived water rights. This weakens the security of any 
water rights that farmers thought they held, reducing their incentives for wise use and transfer 
(Bretsen and Hill, 2009, 741-2).
47  
  The water held by Indian tribes potentially is a major source of water for marketing. 
Indian tribes have reserved water rights sufficient for the development of agriculture on their 
reservations. Their water rights date from when the reservation was established by treaty with the 
federal government, which was usually in the 19th century, and therefore generally supersede the 
priority  of  non-Indian  claimants.  Many  of  these  treaty  provisions  have  only  been  recently 
enforced and Indian water rights adjudicated through litigation or congressional statute. As water 
prices have risen, tribes have begun to be active participants in water markets.  
  Many parties, then, are involved in water transactions. Their differential interests raise 
the transaction costs of water trades and potentially weaken water rights.  
 
VII. Concluding Remarks: Water Rights, Water Markets, Efficiency and Equity Concerns. 
  This paper has outlined the complex nature of water as a mixed private/public resource, 
and  how  that  characteristic,  as  well  as its  physical  qualities  complicate its  management  and 
allocation. Although the focus here has been on the U.S. West, similar conditions exist in other 
                                                           
47 As noted by Bretsen and Hill, 2009, 742, point out, in 1993 when the Bureau cut deliveries to the Westlands 
Water District by 50 %  to meet environmental needs, the Ninth Circuit Court ruled that the agency had not breached 
its contract with the district.   
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semi-arid regions where increased fresh water scarcity is raising pressures for more efficient 
water use and management as well as greater equity demands.   
  Efficiency and equity demands often collide in a manner that inhibits action and sustains 
the status quo. This situation, however, is not sustainable as demands on a limited water resource 
grow. There is both a greater need to facilitate the smooth reallocation of water from historical to 
new uses and to improve management of this most critical resource, as well as to provide for 
more environmental, amenity, and recreational uses. Firmer water rights and greater reliance 
upon water markets can address efficiency concerns, and equity issues can be addressed in the 
allocation of water rights and in the regulatory process.  But the latter cannot go too far if the 
efficiency  advantages  of  secure  rights  and  markets  are  to  be  available  for  this  all-important 
resource.  There  are  efficiency/equity  tradeoffs,  and  policies  toward  water  must  reflect  this 
recognition. 
   Critics of appropriative water rights and water markets are explicit in outlining market 
failure.  There  is  not,  however,  a  similar  level  of  precision  in  defining  how  the 
political/judicial/administrative  processes  will  function  to  effectively  manage  and  distribute 
water, let alone address equity concerns, to meet growing challenges regarding the resource. Yet, 
these issues must be addressed before greater authority over water is shifted to the state as part of 
a public interest mandate.  Comparative institutional analysis is necessary to determine how 
much decision making over water will be left optimally to private rights and (regulated) markets 
and how much will be delegated to the political, judicial, and administrative processes. Water 
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